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REGULATING UTILITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawmakers have a duty to act in the best interests of their
constituents. Bearing this obligation in mind, legislators collec-
tively attempt to codify public policy by enacting statutes and
adopting regulations. Although legislators deal with a myriad
issues, their treatment of utility companies serves as the basis of
this discourse. This paper includes a sampling of rules, laws and
regulations from various states in addition to defenses available to
utilities.' In short, the purpose of this paper is to survey the
protections for the utility industry and the public, enacted by
legislative bodies.
II. EXCAVATION ACTS
Anyone who performs work on or around a gas, water,
electric or telephone utility line risks harming themselves and
hindering a utility's service to the general public. Due to this type
and related injuries, lawsuits are often filed against utilities. In
fact, utilities have been subjected to liability for personal injuries
attributable to its service lines whether or not it was aware of
persons in the vicinity. For personal safety and protection of the
utility, statutes have been enacted which govern work on or around
utility lines.
A. Purposes of Underground Utility Facility
Damage Prevention Acts
The purposes of the Illinois Underground Utility Facilities
Damage Prevention Act are as follows: (i) to prevent negligent or
unsafe excavation or demolition operations, (ii) to protect persons
I Defenses available to utilities include the following, which will be
discussed at length: (i) Overhead Power Line Acts, (ii) Excavation Acts, (iii)
Anti-Indemnity Statutes, (iv) Tariffs, (v) Limitations of Liability, (vi) General
Tort Principles, and (vii) Additional Alternative Defenses.
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and property, and (iii) to preserve utility services.2 This rationale
is typical and has been cited by other legislatures enacting similar
laws. 3
B. Inquiry requirements
In Wyoming, excavators have an affirmative duty to search
for underground utility lines before performing an excavation.4
This requirement has been expanded by the Connecticut legislature
such that: "[n]o person ... shall engage in excavation ... at or near
the location of public utility facilities ... without having first
ascertained the location of all underground facilities of public
utilities in the area of such excavation ... in the manner prescribed
in this chapter and in such regulations as the department shall
adopt pursuant to Section 357 .5 Louisiana Revised Statute
40:1749.13 similarly provides that: "except as provided in this
section, no person shall excavate or demolish in any street,
highway, public place or servitude of any operator, or near the
location of an underground facility or utility, or on the premises of
a customer served by an underground facility or utility without
having first ascertained... the specific location of all underground
facilities or utilities in the area which would be affected by the
proposed excavation or demolition.
6
Wyoming statute § 37-12-302(b) contains a penalty
provision, stating that a person who fails to inquire "and whose
excavation causes injury or damage to an underground facility,
shall be liable for all damages, including personal injury and
property damages, caused by the excavation."
7
2 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1 (West 1996).
3 See infra.
4 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 37-12-302(b) (1998).
5 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-346 (2000).
6 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1749.13 (West 2000); BellSouth Telecom.,
Inc. v. Indus. Enter., Inc., 690 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997).
7 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 37-12-302(K) (1998); see Hynes v. Energy West,
Inc., 211 F.3d 1193, 1205 (10t" Cir. 2000).
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C. Notice requirements
In Ohio, a governmental agency serves as an intermediary
between utilities and excavators. Under Ohio law, a developer or
excavator must notify the Ohio Utilities Protection Service
8("OUPS") prior to any excavation. OUPS, in turn, must notify all
of the underground utility providers in the area of the proposed
excavation. 9 Utilities must then notify the developer or excavator
of their underground utility facilities at the proposed excavation
site.
Connecticut has a similar statutory provision which reads in
pertinent part: "[a] person, public agency or public utility respon-
sible for excavating ... at or near the location of public utility
facilities ... shall notify the central clearinghouse of such proposed
excavation, ... orally or in writing, at least two full days, excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, but not more than thirty days
before commencing such excavation."10  Additional issues may
impact liability if a statute has a third party entity as an
intermediary. For example, if an intermediary is a governmental
entity, the issues of sovereign immunity may shield it from
potential lawsuits for its failure to perform its duty.
In BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. Industrial Enters., Inc., the
Louisiana Court of Appeals held that in addition to notice, it was
necessary to obtain a response from the notified utility before
commencing excavation. 1' In that case, an excavator was liable to
a local telephone exchange carrier for negligently damaging the
carrier's underground cables during the course of an excavation
was performed in violation of Louisiana Underground Utilities and
Facilities Damage Prevention Law.12 After the excavator contacted
the regional notification center and gave notice of its intent to
excavate, the excavator proceeded with its excavation before
8 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.27(A) et seq. (West 2001).
9 Id. § 3781.27(B).
10 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-346 (2000); AT&T Communications v. Corsetti
Constr., Inc., 1996 WL 555219, (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996).
1 I See BellSouth Telecom., Inc., 690 So.2d 145.
12 Id.; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1749.13 (West 2000).
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receiving information regarding the approximate location and type
of underground facilities. 13 Thus, damages were attributable to the
excavator.
D. Notification
In- Ohio, notification by OUPS often takes the form of
painted markings on the ground surrounding the proposed
excavation. 14 The markings indicate the location of underground
utility facilities. 15 Different colors of paint identify different
utilities. 16 The failure to provide such notice is deemed to be
notice that no utility lines are present.17 Further, compliance with
the statute requiring an excavator to notify utility company of
excavation "at least forty-eight hours but not more than ten days
before commencing excavation" fulfills an excavator's duty to
inform. 18 In other words, if a utility properly notifies OUPS and
informs them of its intention to dig in 5 days and if no markings
appear at the specified site on the specified date, a utility may
assume that no utility lines are present and be afforded legal
protection.
E. Notice directly to utility
Virginia's Underground Utility Damage Prevention Act,
requires excavation or demolition work to be preceded by at least
forty-eight (48) hours advance notification to all entities furnishing
or transporting materials or services by means of underground
13 See BellSouth Telecoms., Inc. 690 So.2d 145.




17 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.29(A)(1) (Anderson 2001).
18 Ohio Edison Co. v. Wartko Constr., 658 N.E.2d 1118 (Ohio Crt. App.
1995). OHIo REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 3781.28(B)(1), 3781.29(A)(1) (Anderson
2001).
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utility lines.' 9 The requirements of the North Carolina Act are
similar: "a person planning to excavate shall notify each utility
owner having underground utilities located in the proposed area to
be excavated.... ,20
F. Authority of the public utility commission
Rhode Island's General Laws specifically enumerates the
powers of the Public Utilities Commission. Specifically, the Public
Utilities Commission has authority to review city ordinances that
regulate the excavation of city streets to the extent that the
ordinance affects the placing and maintenance of utility
equipment. The Public Utilities Commission also has control
over the means by which utilities connect their services by lines,
pipes, wires, or other implements to buildings occupied by utility
customers.
In sum, in order find out where utility lines are located
prior to excavation, some specific procedure must be followed.
This process varies from state to state. It must be assumed,
however, that utility lines are present in the proposed area of
excavation since the procedure typically involves notification of
the proposed excavation site to public utilities, governmental
agencies or both.
G. Exemptions from notice requirement
The North Carolina Underground Damage Prevention Act,
obligates a utility to provide line location information to an
excavating party upon request. 22 The act does not allow the utility
to charge the excavator for such services. 23  The legislature
19 VA. CODE ANN. § 1950, 56-265.14 et seq. (Michie 2000); Chesapeake
& Potomac Tel. Co. v Properties One, 439 S.E.2d 369, 370 (1994).
20 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-102(a) (1989).
21 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 24-5-1, 24-5-1.1, 39-1-30, 45-15-8 (1956).
22 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-102 et seq. (2000).
23 Id.
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intended the act to serve as mechanism for orderly preservation of
utility services to customers at no direct cost to the public.
24
North Carolina law exempts several excavations from the
notice requirement, including: (i) agricultural tilling, (ii) certain
excavations by the State, (iii) pole replacements, (iv) where there
exists an emergency involving danger to life, health, or property
requiring immediate correction, (v) to continue the operation of a
major industrial plant, and (vi) in order to assure the continuity of
utility services.
25
H. Requirements of utilities
Ohio law states that: "within forty-eight hours of receiving
notice each utility shall locate and mark the approximate location
of its underground utility facilities at the excavation site.26 If the
utility cannot accurately mark the approximate location, the utility
shall mark the approximate location to the best of its ability, notify
the excavator that the markings may not be accurate, and provide
additional guidance to the excavator in locating the facilities as
needed during the excavation".
27
I. Excavation contract and bid document
requirements
Texas law requires that the following must be included in
excavation contracts in which a contractor is employed and in
which a trench excavation will exceed a depth of five (5) feet: (1)
a reference to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA") standards for trench safety in effect during the period of
construction of the project; (2) a copy of special shoring require-
ments, if any, of the state or political subdivision in which the
construction project is located, with the separate payment noted for
the special shoring requirements; (3) a copy of any geotechnical
24 See Cont'l TeL Co. v. Gunter, 394 S.E.2d 228, 230 (1990).
25 Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-106 (2000).
26 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.29 (West 2001).
27 Id.
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information that was obtained by the owner for use in the design of
the trench safety system; and (4) a separate pay item for trench
excavation safety protection.28 Further, a municipality may adopt
an ordinance that refuses a building permit to one who fails to
certify in writing that the aforementioned requirements of have
been satisfied. A municipality, in lieu of or in addition to the
written certification, may require an applicant for a building permit
to produce for inspection or file with the municipality a copy of a
contract that complies with the above, as a condition precedent to
the issuance of a building permit.
29
J. Requirements of person or entity performing
excavation
Ohio law sets forth specific regulations governing the
actual excavation process. Specifically, when making excavations,
the excavator shall maintain reasonable clearance between any
underground facility and the cutting edge or point of powered
equipment. 30 Also, when approaching underground utility facilities
while excavating with powered equipment, an individual other
than the equipment operator is required to look for any sign of the
underground utility lines.31 Finally, the excavator must conduct the
excavation in the vicinity of the underground utility facility in a
careful and prudent manner, excavating by hand, if necessary, to
determine the precise location of the facility and to prevent
damage.
32
K. Court ordered injunctions to stop excavation
In Illinois, the court's authority under the Underground
Utility Facilities Damage Prevention Act, to enter an injunction
28 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 756.022 (Vernon 2000).
29 Id.
30 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.30 (West 2001); East Ohio Gas Co. v.
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preventing negligent or unsafe excavation or demolition that is
likely to result in damage to an underground utility or community
antenna television system facilities is not limited solely to specific
job sites identified in advance.33 Instead, it includes future work at
unidentified sites.
34
L. After actual damage occurs
Texas law sets forth the following procedure in the event
that damage occurs in the excavation process:
(a) If an excavation operation results in damage to an
underground facility, the excavator shall immediately
contact the underground facility operator to report the
damage.
(b) If the excavator is not certain of the operator's identity, the
excavator shall contact a notification center to report the
damage, and the notification center shall immediately
notify all other affected notification centers. Immediately
on receiving notification, each notification center shall con-
tact each member operator that has underground facilities
in or near the area in which the damage occurred.
(c) Only the operator or a person authorized by the operator
may perform repairs, and the repairs must be made in an
expeditious manner.
(d) An excavator shall delay backfilling in the immediate area
of the damage until the damage is reported to the operator
and a repair schedule is mutually agreed to by the excavator
and the operator.
33 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1 (West 1996).
34 Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Lake County Grading Co. Of Libertyville,
Inc., 728 N.E.2d 1178 (2000).
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(e) If damage endangers life, health, or property because of the
presence of flammable material, the excavator shall keep
sources of ignition away.35
M. Burden of proof
A utility, as the aggrieved party, has the burden to prove by
a fair preponderance of the evidence that a city ordinance
governing excavation of city streets was unreasonable or caused
undo burden. 36 A mere incidental burden on the business and
services of a utility, whether financial or otherwise, is not enough
to support the Public Utilities Commission's nullification or
modification of a city ordinance.37 The burden, specifically, must
have a substantial adverse impact upon the business of the utility.
38
If a utility succeeds in doing so, then the burden shifts to the city to
show that the ordinance was not unreasonable or burdensome.
39
This would require evidence of the costs incurred by the city as a
result of the utilities' excavating and faulty restorations, which is
what appears to have prompted the ordinance to be enacted.
N. Potential comparative negligence of utility
Under Louisiana law, an excavators' violation of
Louisiana's Underground Utilities and Facilities Damage
Prevention Law does not preclude him or her from presenting
comparative negligence defense.4 °  This may be based, for
35 Tex. Util. Code § 251.159 (Vernon 2000).
36 In re Ordinance Adopted by the City of Providence, 745 A.2d 769 (R.I.
2000) (ordinance governed timing of excavation, type of material that had to be
used to repair holes, fees charged, insurance required and myriad of other
obligations of utility).
37 Id.; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-1-30 (2003).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 BellSouth Telecomms, Inc. v. Johnson Bros. Corp., 106 F.3d 119 (5t'
Cir. 1997).
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example, on alleged inaccuracy of a utility plat provided by a
utility.
41
0. Excavators assume risk
There is no duty to warn of known or obvious dangers.
The risk of striking underground utility lines during excavation is
42an obvious danger. In Schaub Equipment Rental, Inc. the court
held that defendants, who were under a regulatory obligation to
ascertain the location of utilities before undertaking an excavation,
appreciated this risk.43
P. Vicarious liability to landowner in case of
excavation contractor negligence
In Virginia, a contractor's failure to comply with statutory
notification procedures, per se, will not render a landowner
vicariously liable for damages resulting from excavation on his or
her property.44  Generally, one who employs an independent
contractor is not liable for injuries to another resulting from the
contractor's negligence.45 Courts recognize exceptions to this rule,
however, under some circumstances. For example, an employer
can be vicariously liable for an independent contractor's negli-
gence under the doctrine of respondeat superior, in cases where
negligent hiring and dangerous instrumentalities are involved.46 In
sum, the extent to which a landowner may be held vicariously
liable with respect to the negligence of an excavation contractor
depends on several factors, including the legality of the contractual
agreement, the specific manner in which the excavation is
performed, and the negligence of the landowner.
41 LA REv. STAT. ANN. § 38:2223 (West 2000).
42 Schaub Equipment Rental, Inc. v Marzec, 186 A.D.2d 990 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1992).
43 Id.
44 See Philip Morris, Incorporated v. Emerson, 368 S.E.2d 268, 278
(1988).
45 Id.
46 Kesler v. Allen, 353 S.E.2d 777 (VA. 1987).
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Q. Sovereign immunity
A city may be sued successfully under the various
excavation acts.47 In Southwestern Bell Tel. v. City of Pawhuska,
the utility brought a claim against the city of Pawhuska, Oklahoma,
under the Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Act.48
Southwestern Bell claimed that one of the utility's underground
cables was damaged while the city was repairing a broken water
line.49 Despite the fact that the court ruled in favor of the city, it
held that in the absence of proper notification as prescribed by
statute, "[the city] would be responsible for the damage to
underground facilities of an operator it did not notify." 50
III. OVERHEAD POWERLINE ACTS
A. Preliminary definitions
Texas statutes define "[h]igh voltage" as "more than 600
volts measured between conductors or between a conductor and
the ground," and "[o]verhead line" as a "bare or insulated electrical
conductor installed above ground but does not include a conductor
that is de-energized and grounded or that is enclosed in a rigid
metallic conduit."
51
B. Restrictions on activities near overhead lines
The Texas Health and Safety Code require a person
responsible for temporary work near high voltage overhead lines to
give notice to operator of lines. 52 Further, a responsible party must
47 See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. v. City of Pawhuska, 964 P.2d 220
(Okla. Civ. App. 1998).
48 Id; OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 63 § 142.6 (West 2000).
49 Id.
50 Southwestern Bell Telephone, 964 P.2d at 222; See also OKLA. STAT.
ANN. Tit. 63 § 142.6(A) (West 2000).
51 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 752.001 (Vemon 2000).
52 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 752.003 (Vernon 2000).
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indemnify an operator of high voltage powerlines for all liability
that an operator incurs as result of contact with a line and all
damages to facilities where the responsible party failed to notify
the operator of work to be done near a line at least forty-eight (48)
hours prior to commencement of such work.53 A responsible party
must also indemnify an operator in the foregoing manner if the
party fails to arrange for de-energization of a line as required by
statute and then brings any part of tool, equipment, machine, or
material within six feet of the line.
C. Policy considerations
The enumerated policy behind the statutes governing
activities near high voltage powerlines is to ensure, to the extent
possible, the safety of persons engaged in such activities.54 In
Chavez v. City of San Antonio, the court specifically referenced its
intent to prevent persons from coming into contact, either directly
or indirectly, with high voltage overhead lines. 55 The purpose of
statutorily imposed indemnification is to place liability for losses
resulting from noncompliance on party responsible for having
workers near a line.
56
D. Regulations concerning powerlines and
negligence
Negligence is the most common cause of action asserted by
plaintiffs in cases involving injuries caused by powerlines. In
order to maintain a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must
show: (i) duty, (ii) breach, (iii) causation, and (iv) damages. 57 In
considering whether a breach has occurred, the applicable standard
53 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 752.004, 752.004(A)(2),
752.008 (Vernon 2000).
54 See Chavez v. City of San Antonio, 21 S.W.3d 435 (Tex. App. 2000).
55 Id.
56 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 752.004, 752.008 (Vernon
2000).
57 Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex.
1995).
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of care required of a utility company may be determined by statute
or regulation. For example, Rule 24 of the Illinois Commerce
Commission provides that in order to "promote safety to the
general public and to employees not authorized to approach
conductors and other current-carrying parts of electrical supply
lines, such parts should be arranged so as to provide adequate
clearance from the ground or other space generally accessible, or
shall be provided with guards so as to isolate them effectively from
accidental contact by such persons. 58 A state highway or railroad
commission may also issue regulations, which may be used in a
similar fashion.59 Specifically, commissions frequently regulate
the proximity of power poles to roadways. 60 Negligence of a power
company may also be predicated on a violation of the public
utilities code. 6 1 Public utilities' codes provide specific distances at
which transmission wires should be hung, the proper distance
between power transmission poles and the distance at which a wire
may cross a street or highway.62
The National Electric Safety Code governs the installation,
operation, inspection and maintenance of overhead electrical
transmission lines.63  National Electric Safety Code §232
specifically indicates, for example, that the twenty (20) foot
minimum height requirement for powerlines is not necessarily
applicable when vehicles higher than 14-feet operate within the
64vicinity of the powerlines. In such cases, the powerlines must be
at least six feet higher than the maximum operating height of
vehicles.
65
In Arkansas Valley Electric Coop. Corp. v. Davis, a 16-
year-old was injured after coming into contact with a 7,200-volt
58 Woody v. South Carolina Power Co., 24 S.E.2d 121, 124 (1943).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 W. J. Dunn, Liability of Electric Power Company for Injury or Death
Resulting From Contact of Crane, Derrick, or other Movable Machine with
Electric Line, 69 A.L.R.2d 93 (1960).
62 See id.
63 3 National Electric Safety Code § 232 (1961).
64 Id.
65 Id.
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electric power line.66 The pole had fallen to the ground due to a
break near the ground.67 The plaintiffs introduced testimony that
the utility pole was at 25 percent strength at the time it broke, and
that the pole was buried at a depth of 58 inches underground,
rather than 60 inches underground.68 Both of these items violated
the National Electric Safety Code standards. 69 In consideration of
these violations, the court held that the electric company was
negligent.7 °
The National Electric Code sets forth similar installation
and maintenance standards of how a customer should install and
maintain his own equipment and wiring. These are typical
examples of codes that have frequently been incorporated into
municipal building codes, state codes, utility regulations and
federal laws.71 Both codes, incidentally, are updated periodically
by the National Fire Protective Association, which is a non-
governmental association that monitors and enacts prospective
code and safety standards.
Violations of rules set forth by the various states' Public
Utilities Acts may also form the basis of a negligence action.72 In
First Trust & Savings Bank of Kankakee v. Commonwealth Edison
Co., an action was brought against the power company when
decedents died as a result of injuries which occurred when an
antenna that decedents were attempting to remove made contact
with overhead power lines.73
Here, the Illinois Court of Appeals held that the power
company did not have a legal duty to guard against contact of





71 See National Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 29 USC §§
951-955 (West 2001); U. S. Department of Labor, Bulletin Number 216 (rev.
1968).
72 77 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 111 2/3 (West 1981).
73 In First Trust & Savings Bank of Kankakee v. Commonwealth Edison
Co., 490 N.E.2d 255 (1986) cert. denied 479 U.S. 916 (1986).
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antenna with overhead power lines strung over private property.
74
Specifically, the court dismissed the case for failure to state a cause
of action: that defendant was negligent in maintaining its power
lines by failing to insulate adequately, failing to maintain the lines
at an adequate height, and failing to warn of the danger posed by
the lines. In other words, the power company met the minimum
standard, and therefore owed no duty to the plaintiff. Further, the
court held that compliance with the rule regarding minimum
clearance of power lines suspended over areas accessible to
pedestrians took precedence over general safety rules regarding a
general duty to install and maintain lines "so as to reduce hazards
to life as far as practicable."
76
E. Negligence for noncompliance with standard
industry practice
Standard industry practice may also dictate the applicable
standard of care. Consensus standards provide the underlying
basis for accepted industry practice, and take the form of formal
documents prepared by recognized industry and governmental
experts as well as experts from nonprofit professional associations.
Two such professional associations are the Underwriters'
Laboratories, and the National Electric Contractors Association.
77
Other documents may also dictate the applicable standard of care,
including: (i) documents from the National Safety Council's
Accident Prevention Manual, (ii) Rural Electrification
Administration Bulletins (REA), (iii) insurance company safety
manuals, (iv) electrical utility company design standards, and (v)
safety rules and regulations promulgated by electric companies.78
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 256.
77 Bill Wishland, Electric Company's Failure To Exercise Reasonable
Care Regarding Powered Transmission 17 Am. Jur. POF 2d 643 (1978); Richard
C. Tinney, Liability for injury or death resulting when object is manually
brought into contact with, or close proximity to, electric line, 33 A.L.R.4th 809
(1984).
78 See Dehn v. Otter Tail Power Co. 251 N.W.2d 404 (1977).
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The fact that a utility has followed standard industry
practice and its own safety rules and regulations, however, does
not necessarily prove due care.79 In Black v. Public Service
Electric & Gas Co., the court stated that adherence to the National
Electric Safety Code is only a "relevant factor" in determining due
care, and that a negligence suit may be actionable despite
compliance. 8° Here, an electric utility erected both voltage wires
and a supporting pole near the plaintiffs barbed-wire fence. 81
Later, an un-insulated guy wire from the pole came into contact
with the fence thereby causing a fire and damaging the plaintiffs
property.82 The utility produced evidence proving that such
construction complied with both the applicable safety rules and
standard construction practices. 83 The court held that under such
circumstances, the defendant utility was not absolved from liability
merely because the construction had complied with safety rules
and standard construction practices.84 The court specifically stated
that danger should be anticipated when high tension, un-insulated
wires are strung or maintained in such a position that contact
during the ordinary course of operation by a utility may occur
between them and cranes or other machinery in the vicinity.
8 5
F. Defenses
The standard defenses asserted by electric companies when
defending personal injury actions are generally statutory and code
compliance, industry standard, assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, comparative negligence, worker's compensation limits,
and additional alternative defense theories, which are discussed
later. Although Texas is no longer a contributory negligence state,
the contributory negligence doctrine is applicable to several states.






85 Id. at 134.
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Under the contributory negligence doctrine, there can be no
recovery of damages for injuries negligently inflicted on one
person by another, if the injured person, by his own negligence or
by the negligence of another legally imputable to him, proximately
contributed to his injury. 86 In short, contributory negligence on the
part of the plaintiff is a complete defense in an action based on the
negligence of the defendant. 87 Similarly, the Restatement (Second)
of Torts §479 (1965) says that except where the defendant has the
"last clear chance," the plaintiffs contributory negligence bars
recovery against a defendant whose negligent conduct would
otherwise make him liable to the plaintiff for the harm sustained by
him. 88 The last clear chance or discovered peril doctrine can be
summarized as follows: [t]he party who last has a clear
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligence of his opponent, is considered solely responsible for
it."
89
In Mann v. Hart County Elec. Membership Corp., the court
stated: "[w]here the second actor, after having become aware of
the existence of a potential danger created by the negligence of the
first actor, acts negligently in respect of the dangerous situation
and thereby brings about an accident with injurious consequences
to others, the first actor is relieved of liability, because the
condition created by him was merely a circumstance and not the
proximate cause of the accident." 9° In that case, the plaintiff was a
passenger on a sailboat. 91 Although the owner of the boat Was
aware of the risks associated with sailing under power lines, he
proceeded to do so. 92 The boat's mast struck the electrified lines,
thereby killing both passengers. 93 The court held that the owner's
86 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 842 (1989).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Womack v. Stephens, 550 S.E.2d 18 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).




44 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
negligence superseded the electric company's negligence and
proximately caused the plaintiff s injuries.
94
Johnston v. New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Light Co.
applies the contributory negligence doctrine to children.95  In
Johnston, the court held that a 12-year-old should possess
sufficient knowledge that a wire carrying electrical current is
capable of causing shock or injury should one come in contact with
it.96  Because the boy was of sufficient age, intelligence and
experience to understand the risk of climbing to the top of the tree
in proximity to overhead power lines, the court ruled him guilty of
contributory negligence, and therefore, dismissed the case.
97
Contributory negligence must be distinguished from
assumption of risk. The defense of assumption of risk does not
necessarily put the plaintiff's due care at issue. Instead, the inquiry
focuses on the plaintiffs knowledge and appreciation of the
danger, and his or her willingness to be exposed to it.
98
Where worker's compensation serves as the exclusive
remedy, plaintiff may be estopped from asserting a cause of action
against a utility. This defense is clearly illustrated by Virginia
statutory and case law. Section 65 of the Virginia Code states that
where an independent contractor is performing work which is a
part of trade, business or occupation of the owner, the employees
of the independent contractor are statutory employees of the owner
under Virginia law.99 As a result, they are limited to compensation
and benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Virginia,
and are precluded from instituting or maintaining a common law
suit against the owner.' 00
94 Id.
95 Johnston v. New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Light Co. 113
N.W. 526 (1907).
96 Id.
97 Id.; See also Suarez v. Omaha P.P. Dist., 352 N.W.2d 157 (1984)
(injured 12 year old testified he knew before he climbed tree that power lines
were strung though, the court, however, held to appreciate danger to himself.)
98 Id.
99 VA. CODE ANN. §§1950, 65.1-29, 65.1-40 (Michie 2000).
100 Id.
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On the other hand, a general contractor's status as a
"statutory employer" may lessen restrictions on an injured
employee's right to recover, and consequently on an employer's
liability, under the Workmen's Compensation Act.' 0' The decisive
factor in making the statutory employer determination is whether
the work being performed by the injured worker was part of the
trade, business or occupation of the general contractor. 10 2 If the
general contractor is deemed a statutory employer, he is immune
from a common law action brought by the injured workman.'0 3 If
the work being performed was not a part of the general
contractor's trade, business or occupation, then the general
contractor is not a statutory employer, and is not liable for
workmen's compensation. 10 4 Further, an injured workman's right
to maintain a common law negligence action against the employer
remains available.'
0 5
In Snowden v. VEPCO, work was performed by plaintiffs
as employees of a subcontractor, as part of the defendant utility's
business. 10 6  The defendant utility contracted with the general
contractor, who subcontracted with the plaintiffs' employer to
drive steel piles into the ground. 10 7 Here, the court determined that
the utility was a statutory employer. 10 8 Therefore, when a crane
owned and operated by subcontractor came into contact with an
overhead power line, the plaintiffs were limited to exclusive rights
and remedies for injuries sustained. 109
The High-Voltage Safety Act, GA. CODE ANN. requires
notice to be given before work is performed near high voltage
lines, and makes owners and operators of lines immune from
1ot VA. CODE ANN. §§1950, 65.1-29, 65.1-40 (Michie 2000); Slusher v.




105 Id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 1968, 65.1-5 (Michie 2000); Farish v. Courion
Indus., Inc., 722 F.2d 74 (4t' Cir. 1983).
106 Snowden v. VEPCO, 423 F.Supp 423 F.Supp. 266 (E.D.Va. 1976).
107 Id.
108 Id.
1o9 Id.; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-100, 65.1-40 (Michie 2000).
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liability if no notice is given.' 10 The act does not require an owner
or operator of power lines to advise the public that a particular line
is high-voltage despite that the public might not be aware of the
voltage of particular lines."'
The Texas notice requirement may also give rise to a
defense. In Chavez v. City of San Antonio ex rel. City Public
Service Board of San Antonio, a tree trimmer could not recover
from the operator of power lines for injuries he sustained when a
tree limb came into contact with the high voltage lines."l 2 The
court based its decision on the statutory requirement that requires
notification to an operator of power lines at least forty-eight (48)
hours in advance of work to be done proximate to the lines.1 3 The
tree trimmer failed to fulfill statutory duty to notify and arrange for
de-energization of line."l 4  Thus, due to noncompliance with
notification requirements the court held that the operator was
entitled to indemnification for all liability and damages.
115
G. Punitive damages
Generally, the principles governing recovery of compensa-
tory damages in cases involving utility-based injuries are the same
as for personal injury or wrongful death actions.1 16  Punitive
damages are imposed for the purpose of punishment and
110 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-34(b), 46-3-39(a) (2000); Santana v. Georgia
Power Co., 498 S.E.2d 521 (1998).
III Id.
112 Chavez v. City of San Antonio ex rel. City Public Service Board of San
Antonio, 21 S.W.3d 435 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).




116 Bill Wishard, Electric Company's Failure to Exercise Reasonable Care
Regarding Downed Transmission Line or Pole, 17 Am. Jur. POF 2d 643 (1978).
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deterrence.117 This remedy is so extraordinary or harsh, however,
that it should be applied only sparingly.
118
Where a utility acts with wanton or willful misconduct, the
power company may be liable for punitive damages."' 9  For
common law punitive damages claims, the evidence must meet the
"clear and convincing" standard of proof.120 In negligence cases,
punitive damages are awardable only if the defendant knew or had
reason to know there was a high degree of probability that the
action would result in injury at the time of the negligent act.' 21
Punitive damages cannot be collected, however, unless the
defendant showed complete indifference to or conscious disregard
for the safety of others.' 22 Accordingly, the plaintiff must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence conduct on the part of the
defendant that is more egregious than that on which the claim of
negligence is based. 1
23
In Ellis v. Kerr-McGee Chemical, an automobile passenger
brought a negligence action against the utility, which owned the
pole, the manufacturer of the pole and the utility pole inspector for
injuries received when a utility pole fell on her car.12 4 There, the
utility in question conducted only one documented inspection of
the pole over the twenty-six (26) year period prior to the injury.
125
Since the pole was wood and wood is subject to decay over a
period of time, the court held that the potential danger was
obvious. 26 Accordingly, the court held that the utility was liable
117 Letz v. Turbomeca Engine Corp., 975 S.W.2d 155, 177 (Mo. Ct. App.
1997).






123 Litchfield v. May Dept. Stores, 845 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1992).
124 Ellis v. Kerr-McGee Chemical, 1999 WL at 969278.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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due to negligence. Finally, it is significant that the utility in this
case acted in accordance with industry standards. 1
27
Here again, the court held that mere compliance with industry
standards is insufficient, per se, to support a finding that a
defendant has not breached its duty of care.1 28 Thus, the jury was
free to conclude that compliance with industry standards did not
shield the utility from liability and that the industry standards were




Supplying the American public with water began in 1652
as a business opportunity for private enterprise. 3 ' By the mid-
1800s, however, private companies could not lay pipelines in
lower income areas, offer reasonable prices, and at the same time
continue to profit.' 31 Accordingly, by the mid-1800s, the water
industry was primarily owned by the government. 13  At present,
the industry is changing. 133 Water suppliers are currently under
pressure to decrease spending, "cut operating costs, repair aging
infrastructure, and meet all the new environmental rules."'
34
The government presently controls eighty-five percent of
the public water supply industry. 35 Thus, without government
support, changes cannot be made. 136  It is worth considering,
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challenges since private ownership arguably cultivates the
imagination, initiative, and investment needed to push utilities to a
higher level of development.1 37  The successful deregulation of
certain utilities in Texas proves that this solution merits
investigation.
B. American Water Works Association
Requirements
All cast iron piping is made according to specifications
adopted by the American Water Works Association ("Associa-
tion"). 138 The Association is a group comprised of thousands of
water utilities that, in part, allows pipe purchasers to obtain a
standardized product with confidence regardless of manufac-
turer.139 There are four types of piping systems in water utilities.
Transmission lines are very large pipes that carry water from its
source to the water works for treatment, or from the water works or
pumping station to a community distribution system. Distribution
mains are pipes with diameters of about 4 inches that pick up water
from transmission lines and distribute it throughout the commu-
nity. Service lines are pipes with smaller diameters, usually less
than 2 inches, which carry water from the distribution main to a
customer's home or business. Finally, aboveground "flanged"
pipes are used in water treatment plants and pumping stations.
140
C. Texas
In Texas, the past two decades have seen incredible
changes in every public utility except water.' 41 Fortunately, Senate
Bill 1 ("S.B. 1") will facilitate such change in Texas.' 42 S.B. 1 is a
137 Id.
138 United States v. Amsted Indus. Inc., No. 71-C-3124, 1974 WL 914
(N.D. I11. July 19, 1974).
139 Id.
140 Id. at 2.
141 Leonard S. Hyman et al., The Water Business: Understanding the
Water Supply and Wastewater Industry at 133, 155-56.
142 Id.
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comprehensive water resource planning, management, and
development bill that signaled an important change in Texas's
strategy for meeting its water needs. 143 The Bill combines local
control with statewide oversight to "develop a consensus-based
plan" by vesting various agencies and water districts with planning
and regulatory power. 144
The Bill is ordered as follows. Article 1 delineates the
planning process by which each agency and water district is
required to submit a plan for approval before its implementation.
45
Article 2 encourages water marketing by enhancing the Texas
Water Bank, an entity in which surface and groundwater rights
may be deposited.146 Article 2 also addresses reuse of groundwater
and surface water, distinguishing between direct and indirect
reuse. 147 Article 3 focuses on enforcement, emergency transfers,
and dam safety, providing mechanisms to enable timely relief
during drought and giving those adversely affected by an
emergency transfer the right to recover the fair market value of
damages suffered. 148  Article 4 deals with surface water and
groundwater supplies. 149 Articles 5 and 6 provides for financial
assistance to small communities as well as to fund local water-
related projects. 150  Article 7 addresses data collection and
management. 15 1 Article 8 establishes an Interim Committee on
Water Resources Development and Management to study water
supply and wastewater infrastructure.1
52
143 John R. Pitts & Janet L. Hamilton, Texas Water Law for the New
Millennium, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1999, at 35.
144 Id.
145 1997 TEX. GEN. LAWS 3610-18 (S.B. 1, Article 2).
146 C. Richard Bath, A Commentary on Texas Water Law and Policy, 39
NAT. RESOURCES J. 121, 123 (1999).
147 John R. Pitts & Janet L. Hamilton, Texas Water Law for the New








In Nebraska, local ordinances also control. Specifically,
rather than state statutes, local regulations govern the enforcement
of the liens created under the water statutes. 53  Specifically,
NEB.REv.STAT.ANN. § 17-925.01 provides that:
"any city...or.... village is hereby authorized... to
levy a tax...for the purpose of creating a fund to be
used for the maintenance and repairing of
any... water utilities in such city or village. In lieu
of the levy of such tax, the.. .city ...... or.. .village
may establish by ordinance such rates for such
sewer service as may be deemed by them to be fair
and reasonable."'
' 54
For example, the Tecumseh City Code §3-121 provides that
arrearages for water service may be certified to the county clerk:
"to be collected as a special tax in the manner
provided by law... [and] if a customer shall for any
reason remain indebted to the Municipality for
water service furnished, such amount due, together
with any rents and charges in arrears, shall be
considered a delinquent water rent which is hereby
declared to be a lien upon the real estate for which
the same was used."'
155
E. California
In California, water utilities must own and install service
connections and meters at their expense. 156  This includes all
connections from the main line to the curb or property line of the
premises supplied. 157  As each new consumer is added, even
153 NEB.REV.STAT.ANN. § 17-925.01 (Michie 2000).
154 Id.
155 Tecumseh City Code §§ 3-12 1.
156 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 36 § 157 (1931).
157 Id.
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though the company pays for the service connection and meter, the
company benefits.' 58  Thus, there is no reason for allowing an
additional rate.' 59 With respect to economics, California courts
have opined that the water utilities capital structure is relatively
stable. 6 ° With respect to the rate of return, the court held that the
public utilities commission will consider that the water utilities
capital structure is less risky than most utilities.
1 6 1
Water utilities deal in a basic commodity without
competition and their rates are protected by public utilities com-
missions. Consequently they are a less risky investment than
industrial companies, and a lower return is normally expected and
accepted by investors.' 62 Finally, water utilities in California are
also charged, in part, with protecting the public from fire.
Specifically, statutes award jurisdiction to the public utilities
commission in order to promulgate rules and regulations setting
standards for adequate fire protection service to be furnished by
water utilities under the commission's jurisdiction.'
63
F. Montana
In Montana, cities and towns are responsible for regulating
publicly-owned water utilities.' 64  The Montana Public Service
Commission, an executive branch of the state, is responsible for
regulating privately-owned water utilities. 165  Customers of
privately-owned water utilities in Montana own the water service
lines running between their premises and the water main in the
public street. 166  Before 1987, these customers assumed
158 CAL. CODE REGS. tit.42 § 506 (1913).
159 Id.
16o In re: Citizens Utilities Co. of Cal., No. 79699, 52159, 1972 WL 30004
(Cal.P.U.C., Feb 08, 1972).
161 Id.
162 Washington Water & Light Co. Authorized Water Rate Increase, 1972
WL 30035 (Cal.P.U.C. April 4, 1972).
163 73 CAL.PUB.UTIL.CODE 7 (West 1972).
164 MONT.CODEANN. §§ 69-7-101 to 201 (1989).
165 Id. §§ 69-3-101, 69-3-102 (1989).
166 Id§§ 2-15-2601, 2-15-2602 (1989).
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responsibility for the maintenance of the service lines on their
property. 167  As a result, they were held liable for costs and
damages arising out of repairs on their property, as well as for
repairs in the public street.1
6 8
In 1989, the Montana legislature passed MONT.CODE ANN.
§ 69-4-511 (1989). The statute specifically provides that:
"(1) A property owner is responsible for the costs of
constructing privately supplied water service
pipelines from the main to his premises and for
maintaining service pipelines from his property line
to his premises. The private water service provider
is responsible for the cost of maintaining water
service pipelines from the main to the owner's
property line, except that the property owner shall
pay for pipe and other supplies used in maintaining
water service lines between the main. and his
property line.
(2) A property owner is not liable for any injury or
property damage associated with excavation in
maintaining water service pipelines if the
excavation does not occur between his property line
and his premises."'
169
This statute holds privately owned water utilities liable for
most repairs of lines between customers' property and the utility's
main line and mandates that privately owned water utilities
reimburse customers for costs of these repairs. Further, by
exempting customers from liability for injuries caused by repair of
their lines past their property boundaries, the statute apparently
imposes liability for damages arising from these repairs upon
privately owned water utility.
167 MONT. ADMIN. R. 38.5.2502(5)(1987).
168 MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-7-101 to 201 (1989).
169 Id.
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V. PUBLIC UTILITIES & TARIFFS
A. Generally
A tariff is defined as "A public document setting forth
services of a common carrier being offered, rates and charges with
respect to services, and governing rules, regulations, and practices
relating to those services."
170
Besides governing a rate structure, the tariff may include
limitations of liability for damage to the customer it serves.
Overreaching by the utility in its tariff may subject it to criticism
by the court--"[w]hen a public utility tariff is involved, it does not
matter whether the limiting language appears in the contract or in
the tariff.. .in either case, the analysis is the same."' 71  Tariffs
which purport to limit a utility's liability for gross negligence or
willful or wanton misconduct have been held to be
unreasonable. 1
72
B. Recent developments in Texas
In Texas, certain utilities are, by definition, recognized as
monopolies in the area they serve. 173 These utilities are regulated
by a public agency that serves as a substitute for competition by
approving rates, operations, and services to consumers.1 74 While
Texas' electricity market was deregulated on January 1, 2002,175
its reliance on tariffs to limit its liability is as strong as ever.
170 Black's Law Dictionary 1457 (6th ed. 1990).
171 See Shawnee Milling Co. v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 101 Kan. 307,
166 P 493 (1917); McNally Pittsburg Mfg. Corp. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 186
Kan. 709, 353 P. 1992, 204 (1960).
172 Id.
173 See Texas Public Utility Regulatory Act, TEX. UTIL. CODE § 11.002
(Vernon Supp. 1998).
174 Id.
175 See TEX. S.B., 7, 76 h R.S. (1999).
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1. Grant v. Southwestern Electric Power Co.
a. Generally
In Grant v. Southwestern Electric Power Co., an electric
utility consumer sued an electric utility company for negligence
alleging that electrical problems caused personal injuries and
property damage. 176 In that case, the court specifically addressed
the relationship between public utility tariffs filed with the Public
Utility Commission ("PUC") and their effect on economic
damages and personal injury awards. 1
77
b. Personal injury damages
As a matter of first impression, the court in Grant held that
a tariff provision limiting liability for personal injuries was
reasonable as a matter of law.178 The court based this holding on
its analysis of the filed-rate doctrine and on the extent to which a
utility tariff is subject to the Uniform Commercial Code
(,UCC"). 179
The filed-rate doctrine states that courts will presume that a
tariff approved by a regulatory agency is reasonable.' 80 Since the
personal injury tariff made basis of Grant was approved by the
PUC, a regulatory agency, the court held that the tariff was
presumed to be reasonable. 181 As an aside, it is noteworthy that the
court mentioned in dicta that the tariff was "narrowly drawn, and
provided a remedy for utility's gross negligence or willful
misconduct, such that it did not violate public policy."' 82 Through
176 Grant v. Southwestern Electric Power Co., 73 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2002),
177 Id.
178 Id. at 219.
179 Id.
i0 Id.
181 Since the court utilizes the filed-rate doctrine in a case involving a
water utility in Lone Star Caliper Co. v. Talty Water Supply Corp., the extensive
scope of the doctrine is noteworthy.
182 Id.
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this statement, the court seems to imply, to some degree, that it
might not issue opinions pertaining to tariffs that are overly broad
in scope. Nonetheless, with respect to the filed-rate doctrine, the
court held that the tariff provision limiting liability for personal
injuries in Grant was reasonable.'
83
The court's analysis also hinges on the extent to which a
utility tariff is subject to the UCC. Since the court held that a
utility tariff pertaining to personal injury damages was not subject
to the UCC, it was deemed acceptable. The court's
rationalization for this conclusion is threefold. First, applying the
UCC to utility tariffs would impair the comprehensive statutory
scheme that regulates the sale of electricity to Texas consumers.1
85
Second, this application is expressly prohibited by the UCC.
186
Third, applying the UCC to utility tariffs would impede the PUC's
authority to approve and determine a utility's rates, operations, and
services. 187  Since the UCC is inapplicable to utility tariffs, the
court held that the tariff provision limiting liability for personal
injuries in Grant was appropriate. As an aside, it is noteworthy
that opinions previous to Grant held that Article 2 of the UCC did,
in fact, govern utility tariffs. 188 In sum, the court in Grant held that
the tariff provision limiting liability for personal injuries was legal
due to the filed-rate doctrine and the court's ruling pertaining to
the narrowed scope of Article 2 of the UCC.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 218-19.
185 Effective January 1, 2002, Texas electric companies were deregulated.
See TEX. S.B. 7, 76 th R.S. (1999). At present, the PUC's regulatory role is
limited to its obligation to ensure that all customers demanding less than one
megawatt of service have access to electricity until 2007. See Reliant Energy,
Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm 'n of Tex., 62 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); Tex.
Util. Code Ann. § 39.051 (Vernon 1998); See White, Gaye, Annual Survey of
Texas Law: Energy Regulation, 56 SMU L. Rev. 1589, 1589-1590 (2003).
186 Id.; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 2.102 (Vemon 2002).
187 See Grant at 218-19; Tex. Util. Code 3 1.001 (b) (Vernon 2002).
188 See, e.g., Grant v. Southwestern Electric Power Co., 20 S.W.3d 764
(Tex.App.-Texarkana, 2000. pet. granted.)
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C. Economic damages
In Grant, the court explicitly refused to entertain specific
requests by the parties to discuss the effect of this opinion on
economic damages. 189  The court makes a bold statement,
however, by failing to rule in this regard. The Grant ruling
mandates that courts presume that approved tariffs are reasonable
through its ratification of the filed-rate doctrine. When this
holding is taken in concert with the concurrent and narrowing of
the scope of the UCC, the vehicle through which courts formerly
asserted control over utilities, tariffs and the Public Utility
Commission in Texas, the Supreme Court's decision to uphold the
power of state regulatory agencies becomes increasingly clear.
2. Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Auchan
USA, Inc.
The limitation of liability clause in a tariff approved by the
Public Utility Commission of Texas, and granted to Houston
Lighting & Power Company, was the basis of litigation in Houston
Lighting & Power Co. v. Auchan USA, Inc. 190 In Auchan, a grocery
store lost over $275,000 worth of inventory due to the failure of a
transformer. Auchan sued the utility, asserting that the tariff was
an unreasonable limitation on liability.' 9' It is noteworthy that
unless found to be unreasonable, filed tariffs govern a utility's
relationship with its customers and have the force and effect of
law. 192 The Texas Supreme Court held that the tariff provision
limiting liability for economic damages caused by an electric
utility's ordinary negligence was reasonable on its face, and thus
189 See Grant at 222-23.
190 Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Auchan USA, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 668
(Tex. 1999).
191 Id.
192 Henderson v. Central Power & Light Co., 977 S.W.2d 439, 446 (Tex.
Ct. App, pet. denied).
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could be applied to the economic loss caused by the power
failure. 1
93
The United States Supreme Court addressed limitations of
liability by a utility company in 1894.194 In Primrose v. Western
Telegraph Co., a telegraph company attempted to limit its liability
for improperly transmitted messages.' 95 In that case, the court held
that the limitation of liability should be valid, in the absence of
willful misconduct or gross negligence.1 96  Decisions of other
jurisdictions also influenced the decision of the court in Auchan.
While some jurisdictions require a plaintiff to show gross
negligence or wanton or willful misconduct by the utility to
recover damages beyond those provided in the tariff, other
jurisdictions have held exculpatory provisions to be invalid. 1
97
Public policy reasons in favor of liability limitations also
support the holding of Auchan. First, without a proper limitation
of liability for ordinary negligence, utilities would be likely be
forced to raise rates charged to their customers. 198 Second, it has
been argued that a majority of the losses would be absorbed by a
finite number of large industrial customers. 199 Third, a potential
outage in a major city could give rise to a significant amount of
potential liability to a utility.2° ° Fourth, utilities are unique. While
an unregulated business may set prices according to changing
market conditions, utilities have no such flexibility.20 1  Their
financial freedom is limited due to the fact that they must charge
rates as mandated by the Public Utility Commission of Texas.
20 2
By limiting liability, utilities would be afforded the latitude
necessary to compensate them for their inability to vary prices as
often as they might otherwise prefer.
193 See Auchan, 995 S.W.2d at 669-71.
194 See Primrose v. Western Telegraph Co., 154 U.S. 1 (1894).
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Auchan, 995 S.W.2d at 672.
198 Id.
199 Id.; 7 TEX. P.U.C. BULL. at 59.
200 Id. at 674.
201 Id.
202 Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In order to properly assess a scenario involving a utility,
one must read and evaluate applicable rules, regulations, case law
and statutes. Laws concerning utilities have changed over time
and will continue to do so. As legislators attempt to codify public
policy via statutes and regulations in the future, they should
continue to act with eyes towards the protection of the public as
well as the utility industry.

